ABSTRACT: Technological progress can play a key role in maintaining a high standard of living while addressing environmental problems. Well-designed environmental regulations encourage technological innovation, while poorly designed regulations can inhibit technological progress.
I. Introduction
Technological progress can play a key role in the resolving environmental problems while maintaining productivity. However the extent of its contribution depends on how well environmental policies are designed and implemented. Successful environmental policies can contribute to technological innovation and diffusion (Kneese and Schultze, 1978; Jaffe, Newell and Stavins, 2002) , while poor policy designs can inhibit innovation.
Conventional wisdom suggests that environmental regulations impose significant costs on industry, adversely impacting productivity (e.g., Palmer, Oates and Portney 1995) . Recently, however, researchers have challenged this conventional view with an alternative hypothesis that environmental regulations can encourage innovation, potentially resulting in increased productivity and ultimately higher profits. This is the well-known Porter hypothesis (Porter, 1991; Porter and van der Linde, 1995) 1 . Some studies have confirmed that, in principle, market failure associated with technological innovation (e.g., Romer, 1990) can imply circumstances under which environmental regulations can benefit industry (Ulph 1996; Simpson and Bradford 1996; Bovenberg and Smulders 1996; Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw 1999; Mohr, 2002) . 2 Where these circumstances hold, well designed environmental regulations can lead to solutions whereby efficiency is increased in both market and nonmarket outputs. However, there is a broader class of problems where environmental regulations can potentially result in increased social efficiency 1 Jaffe, Newell and Stavins (2000) and Kemp (1997) provide thorough surveys of the literature relating policy, technological change, and the environment.
2 Simpson and Bradford (1996) and Ulph (1996) rely on a two-country, game-theoretic framework where each country hosts one producer. Gains come from exploiting market power, so the models apply only to a subset of environmental industries. Bovenberg and Smulders (1996) explore the role of environmental policy in an endogenous growth model and characterize conditions under which more stringent policies are likely to lead higher growth. Mohr (2002) derives the results using a less restrictive model starting with the observation that new productive capital is often less polluting than prior generations of capital as in Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw (1999) . Using a general equilibrium model with a large number of agents, the model shows that environmental policy can simultaneously increase productivity and welfare. These gains come even without accounting for the value of a cleaner environment.
in the joint production of market and non-market products, so that if there is a decrease in in productive efficiency of market outputs, it is made up for by increased productivity in nonmarket, environmental outputs.
This paper explores these issues using a unique micro-level data set for offshore oil and gas production in the Gulf of Mexico. We recast the Porter hypothesis to calculate productivity change in a joint production model, with a vector of market and non-market outputs. We also test for the causal directions between technological change and environmental regulations. We find no support for the increased productivity of market outputs as stated by the standard Porter hypothesis, but we find support for the Porter hypothesis recast in terms of joint production of /market goods and environmental commodities.
An important challenge faced in empirical tests of the Porter hypothesis is identifying the direction of causality between technological innovation and environmental regulations. New, tougher environmental regulations might spur research and development efforts leading to innovation. But at the same time, technical innovations, especially those in pollution control technologies, may lead federal agencies to develop tougher environmental regulations that capitalize on these new technologies (e.g., Meyer, 1993) . For example, U.S. EPA's technologybased standards are based on concepts like Best Conventional Technology (BCT) or Best Available Technology (BAT). The stringency of new regulations will reflect the technologies known at the time of implementation. Because causality between regulations and innovation may go in either (or both) directions, it is important to identify the direction of causality between regulations and advances in environmental technologies.
Literature Review
Historically, technological change was modeled by simply observing that productivity changed over time (e.g., Solow, 1957) . The use of time as the sole "explanatory" variable for DRAFT 4 technological change has been recognized as merely a "confession of ignorance" (e.g., Arrow, 1962) , in that it doesn't contribute to an understanding the innovation process. Clearly, new technologies do not occur exogenously over time, but are, in part, a result of conscious and costly efforts in research and development (R&D).
Many empirical studies have used patents and R&D expenditures as proxies of technological innovation. While these proxies provide some insights into technological change, they also have important limitations. R&D expenditures indicate the effort expended in the search for new technology, and so provides a measure of inputs to innovation, but R&D expenditures are not necessarily a good proxy for innovation. Many firms conduct R&D fruitlessly for years, and some innovative firms create major breakthroughs with little officially recorded R&D. The measurement issues are especially troublesome for analyses that capitalize on long time series of data. New discoveries based on past knowledge may lead to positive feedbacks that imply an accelerating productivity of R&D (e.g., Romer, 1990) . Or there could be eventual limits to productivity, which imply a diminishing rate of productivity (e.g., Griliches, 1994) . For these or other reasons, the relationship between R&D expenditures and innovation may vary systematically over time so that R&D expenditures could be a misleading measure of innovation rates.
Similarly, use of patents as a proxy for technological change also has important drawbacks. Many patents never see commercial application, many innovations are not patented, and some are subdivided into multiple patents, each covering one or more aspects of the innovation. Changes in patent policies over time may again make patent counts a misleading measure of innovation, particularly over long time periods. In response to these issues, refinements of patent counts use citations as a weight to the patent (see Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001 ). Moss (1993) and Cuddington and Moss (2001) We extend innovation counts as a measure of technological change into an importanceweighted index using the results of an industry survey regarding the importance of specific technological innovations, both in the short term and the long term. Our technological index is described in more detail further below.
Empirical investigations of the relationship between the stringency of environmental regulation and development of new technologies has increased over the last few decades.
Limited evidence that suggests that patent counts and research & development (R&D)
expenditures increase with stringency of environmental regulation. For instance, Lanjouw and Mody (1996) conducted a study of Germany, Japan, and the U.S., which finds a positive relationship between environmental compliance cost (a proxy for environmental regulation stringency) and patenting of new environmental technologies 3 . In addition, Jaffe and Palmer (1997) used US data to investigate the relationship between environmental compliance 3 Lanjouw and Mody (1996) analyze the impact of increase in environmental compliance cost of the patenting of environmental technologies using international data. Lanjouw and Mody provide support the "weak" version of the hypothesis which Jaffe and Palmer (1997) defined the weak version of the Porter hypothesis is that environmental regulation stimulates only certain kind of innovations, which are environmental innovations.
expenditures and R&D expenditures. Here results show no significant relationship between environmental compliance cost and patents. However, they found a significant relationship between compliance costs and R&D expenditure (Jaffe and Palmer, 1997) 4 . Jaffe et al. (1995) review empirical studies on this subject, and show that environmental regulations reduce productivity in the industries. For example, Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990) develop a model to analyze the impact of environmental regulations in the U.S. and conclude that a long-run cost of environmental regulation is a reduction of 1.91% in the level of the U.S.
gross national product. The recent study by Berman and Bui (2001) of the US oil refiners indicates suggests that environmental regulation is productivity enhancing. These studies, however, have been criticized for not considering the full range of impacts of environmental regulations, including possible positive external impacts on other producers (e.g., Barbera and McConnell, 1990; Repetto, 1996) .
Substantial efforts have been made to regulate pollution in most industrialized countries, and the stringency of pollution regulations have continued to increase worldwide. And many economists subscribe to the idea that painful consequences of environmental regulations cannot easily be avoided, since environmental regulation involves additional cost to industry (Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, 1990; Portney 1994; Palmer, Oates and Portney 1995; and Jaffe et. al. 1995 ).
What appears to be the important issue is how to foster compatibility between environmental regulation and technological innovation (& productivity) in order to control the adverse impact on industry to the extent feasible. Thus, environmental regulations that encourage technological change can contribute to a least-cost resolution of environmental problems, while regulations 4 Jaffe and Palmer (1997) consider two measures of innovative activity: total private expenditures on R&D and the number of successful patent applications by domestic firms in an industry. Both of them includes environmental and non-environmental value.
that inhibit technological change may lead to substantially higher costs. Success in this regard will clearly depend on how environmental regulations are designed and implemented.
The controversy regarding the Porter Hypothesis is generated, in part, by a lack of convincing empirical evidence. It is therefore necessary to examine the economic and social impacts of specific regulations. In this paper we use a unique micro-level data on offshore oil and gas production in the Gulf of Mexico to measure technological change to test the Porter hypothesis. We estimate the relationship between environmental regulations and productivity in the offshore oil and gas industry in the Gulf of Mexico, considering the impacts on market outputs and on joint production of market and environmental outputs.
We apply a mathematical programming technique called Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (see, for example, Charnes et al, 1978 , Färe et al, 1985 to compute the total change in productivity over time. We decompose these components to provide a better understanding of the relative importance of various productivity effects over the study period, so as to identify the relative impact of innovation, or the creation of new technologies, diffusion of existing technologies and non-structural productivity effects, such as so-called learning-by-doing.
We then apply these indices to analyze the link between environmental regulation and industrial performance. In the short term, more stringent environmental regulations clearly reduce total factor productivity (TFP) in production of market outputs. With technological change, however, the short-run cost of regulation could conceivably be offset if they stimulate innovation and increase productivity in long term. In this context, environmental regulation may provide a win-win solution, as suggested by the Porter hypothesis. We allowed for the dynamic aspect of the Porter hypothesis to be tested by examining the impact of environmental regulation adopted in a given year on technological change and productivity through the period when the impact dissipates. This allows us to identify both the immediate impact of regulations on productivity, as well as the longer-term impacts.
Some scholars challenge Porter's hypothesis arguing that technological change precedes and drives high environmental stringency (e.g., Meyer, 1993) Thus, when testing the Porter hypothesis it is critical to identify the direction of causality between environmental regulations and advances in environmental technology, because causality between regulations and innovation may go in either (or both) directions. These questions seek empirical answers, and our study attempts to contribute to the literature, empirically and methodologically.
III. Modeling Data Envelopment Analysis
Production frontier analysis provides the Malmquist indexes (e.g., Malmquist, 1953; Caves et al, 1982a Caves et al, , 1982b , which can be used to quantify productivity change and can be 5
Note environmental Kuznets curve test is also suggested to consider both directions using system of equation (Stern 1998). decomposed into various constituents, as described below. Malmquist Total Factor Productivity (MTFP) is a specific output-based measure of TFP that includes all categories of productivity change, measured as the ratio of two associated distance functions (e.g., Caves et al, 1982a Caves et al, , 1982b Efficiency change measures changes the position of a production unit relative to the frontier, socalled "catching up" (Färe et al. 1994) . Scale change measures shifts in productivity due to changes in the scale of operations relative to the optimal scale.
In the endogenous growth theory framework, technological change is decomposed into two categories: innovation and learning-by-doing (e.g., Young 1993) . This relates to the two models of technological change-innovation (e.g., Romer, 1990) , that focuses on the creation of distinct new technologies, and learning-by-doing (e.g., Arrow, 1962) , that looks at incremental improvements in productivity with existing technologies.
We use DEA to calculate these component productivity measures. DEA is a methodology for organizing and analyzing data, and for identifying best practice frontiers. It represents a set of nonparametric mathematical programming techniques developed to estimate the relative efficiency of production units. DEA is not conditioned on the assumption of optimizing behavior on the part of every individual observation, nor does DEA impose any particular functional form on production technology. Avoiding these maintained hypotheses may be an advantage, particularly for analyses with micro data that extend over a long time series, where assumptions of technological efficiency of each and every production unit in all time periods might be suspect.
We use several different versions of the model to measure and decompose productivity changes (Table 1) . First, a base model is used to calculate total productivity change, which measures the total effect of increases in productivity due to improvements in technology for the multi-production production of market and non-market (environmental) goods. Next we decompose total TFP change into improvements in productivity for market outputs and improvements in productivity for environmental outputs:
where TFP Total is the total measure of TFP, which is a measure of the total change in productivity, including both increases in productivity of oil and gas (TFP Market ) and increases in productivity of environmental outputs (TFP Environment ).
To carry out this decomposition, the first model includes variables that measure environmental effects: measures of historic pollution outputs from the Gulf of Mexico, and the second model excludes variables that measure environmental effects. When these environmental input/output variables are included in DEA, DEA calculates technological change after accounting for changes in these environmental effects. The DEA results with this model provide our measure of TFP change for production, which measures increases in productivity after accounting for environment effects. The environment TFP effect is then calculated as:
Unless otherwise indicated, we assume VRS throughout.
Thus, dividing the total measure of productivity change from Model 1 by the productivity measure from Model 2 provides the measure of the improvement (or decrease) in productivity due to productivity change in the environmental sector.
Next we decompose these measures of productivity change into indexes that represent specific technological innovations and a residual, which we generally term learning-by-doing, as defined in Managi, Opaluch, Jin, and Grigalunas (2001 When analyzing productive efficiency for extraction of non-renewable resources such as the oil and gas industry, one face challenges not met in typical areas of production of goods and services. Production from an oil field at some point in time depends upon past production from the field due to depletion effects, in addition to the technology employed and other geologic characteristics of the field (e.g., field size, porosity, field depth, etc). Holding inputs constant, output from a given field follows a well known pattern of initially increasing output, obtaining a peak after some years of production, then following a long path of declining output. For this
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Same method is used also for the index of technological change for oil and gas production (Model 4) (see Managi, Opaluch, Jin, and Grigalunas, 2001 ).
reason we measure productivity change by looking at relative productivity across fields of different vintages, thereby separating productivity effects associated with aging of the field from effects due to differences in the state of technology.
Chung, Färe and Grosskopf (1997) introduced a directional distance function to include improvements in environmental outputs under Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) 8 . In contrast to the Shepard (1970) output distance function that measures efficiency by expanding all outputs simultaneously, the directional distance function measures efficiency due to increasing desirable outputs (market goods) while decreasing undesirable outputs (e.g., pollution emissions). Using the directional distance function specification, our problem can be formulated as follows. Let
output (undesirable output) and market outputs, respectively. Define the technology set (Q) by
Q t represents the set of all output vectors, y and b, which can be produced using the input vector,
x. The directional distance function is defined at t as
where g is the vector of directions which outputs are scaled. For this output oriented distance function, we define g=(y, 0, -b), i.e. desirable outputs are proportionately increased, inputs are held fixed and environmental outputs (pollution) are proportionately decreased.
Since we use a vintage model, the DEA formulation differs from that in Chung, Färe and Grosskopf (1997) . Our DEA formulation is as follows. Let k be field index, t be time (i.e.,
8
Other environmental performance analysis in DEA include Färe, Grosskopf, Lovell and Pasurka (1989) , Färe, Grosskopf, Lovell and Yaisawarng (1993) , Coggins and Swinton (1996), Tyteca, (1997) , Boyd and McClelland (1999) and Hailu and Veeman (2000) . year), i k be time of discovery for field k (i.e., discovery year), and j k be the number of years since discovery of field k (i.e., field year). Thus, for each field, j k = t -i k .
Chung, Färe and Grosskopf (1997) define an output-oriented Malmquist-Luenberger productivity index that is comparable to the Malmquist productivity index, but that includes productivity changes with respect to both desirable and undesirable outputs. In the vintage model, we consider all fields discovered in the same year a vintage group, and we calculate the distance function for each discovery year (i), or vintage group. We then calculate the Malmquist productivity index by comparing distance functions in two different vintages (i and i+1).
Consider discovery year i, the distance function for field k' in field year j' is calculated as
where a is attributes. K(i) includes all fields discovered in i and J(k) is the last field year for field k. For the mixed period distance function, we have two vintage years i and i+1. For example, the output constraint is
Our vintage model differs from conventional DEA models in two ways. First, for each year (t), we consider only fields discovered in that year (i = t). Fields discovered in other years are excluded from calculation of the distance function, although they may be producing at t. In addition, in the constraints, we summarize across both fields (k) and field year (j), although field year is not in the discovery year (except j = 0). Thus, we calculate the distance function for each field k' in field year j'.
In our study, t and i extend from 1968 through 1995; the vectors of outputs (y and b),
inputs (x) and attributes (a) are listed in Table 1 . The weighted innovation index at t is assigned to vintage group i = t, and held constant for all field years (j) in that group (i). Besides the two depletion variables, other attribute variables (e.g., water depth) vary across fields, but are constant over time for a given field. We use cumulative values for inputs (x) and outputs (y), because for the above technology definition (i.e., x can produce y), it is more appropriate to express the production relationship on cumulative terms for a nonrenewable industry. For example, the production in a field at time t is determined by the total number of production wells previously drilled in the field and total stock depletion in the field to date.
Assessment of the Porter Hypothesis
As discussed above, the Porter hypothesis states that well designed environmental regulations can spur technological change, in the long run leading to increased productivity and ultimately to increased profits (Porter, 1991; Porter and van der Linde, 1995) . Technological progress, however, is quite complex and still poorly understood. Contemporaneous analysis of regulation is needed to find the immediate cost of implementing the regulation. But the ultimate impact of environmental regulations will be felt several years later when the induced innovation process has been completed.
This study tests the Porter hypothesis by examining whether lagged levels of the stringency of environmental regulations are associated with increases in technological change.
We use two sets of hypothesis tests, one set based on an Almon distributed lag model (Almon, 1965 ) and a second set based the Granger causality tests (Granger, 1969) .
The Almon lag model relates the technological innovation to prior environmental regulations using the functional specification:
where P t denotes the productivity index at time t, α is a constant term, E t-i denotes lagged environmental regulation index, β i is the coefficient of the i th lag and ε t is a stochastic term. The expected dynamic lagged effects of independent variables can be examined by imposing theoretical restrictions on the coefficients of the lagged values of these variables. In general, the Almon polynomial distributed lag model is an estimation procedure for distributed lags that allows the coefficients of the lagged independent variables to follow a variety of patterns as the length of the lags increases. The degree of these polynomials may vary in order to capture the different lag distributions. An inverted "U" pattern is expected, and a second-degree polynomial is considered appropriate to characterize the lag structure.
The use of Almon lags requires the determination of the appropriate lag periods.
Following common practice (e.g., Harvey, 1990) , we choose the lag length is to minimize the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) 9 . We use this model as an empirical framework to test the possible causal linkages between technological innovation and environmental regulations.
We also apply the Granger causality test (Granger, 1969) to examine the direction of causality between environmental regulations and innovation. The Granger test is related to the concept of precedence. A time series y 1 is said to Granger cause y 2 if the prediction of y 2 can be improved upon by the inclusion of lagged values of y 1 in the information set used to predict y 2 .
In our case, the Porter hypothesis is consistent with a finding that lags on the stringency of 
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We test the null hypotheses is that stringency of environmental regulations does not "Granger cause" productivity change (∆ 12 =0) and the hypothesis that productivity change does not "Granger cause" environmental stringency (∆ 21 =0) using Wald statistics. The results of these tests are used to identify the causal influence between environmental compliance and each component of productivity.
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Note that this same lag also maximizes adjusted R 2 , which is an alternative recommended criterion.
The Porter hypothesis states that well designed environmental regulations could provide a net positive contribution to future productivity, which is consistent with the sum of the lagged coefficients being positive. Thus, the Porter hypothesis implies that the net effect of past levels of environmental regulation has a positive influence on future technological change. In contrast, the traditional view that environmental regulation can only decrease productivity is consistent with the result ∆ 12 < 0.
Our second hypothesis is based on the observation that past levels of technological change induce future increases in the stringency of environmental regulations (∆ 21 > 0). This could be the case, for example, because environmental regulations are technology-based, and therefore technological advances could result in a subsequent increase in the stringency of environmental regulations.
Application
We apply the above methods to oil and gas production in the Gulf of Mexico. The Gulf of Mexico is one of the first areas in the world to begin large scale offshore oil and gas production. Since then, offshore operations in the Gulf of Mexico have played an important role in production and stabilization of energy supply in United States. Federal offshore oil and gas production accounted for 26.3 and 24.3 percent of total U.S. production, respectively (U.S. , 2001) , and the offshore fraction of production has been increasing over time. Oil and gas production in Gulf of Mexico accounted for 88 and 99 percent, respectively, of total U.S. offshore oil and gas production through 1997 (U.S. Department of Interior, 2001).
Department of Interior
Reducing the environmental impact of offshore operations is among the most pressing challenges facing the oil and gas industry in U.S. today. In recent decades, environmental concerns led to numerous new regulations imposed on oil and gas operations. These regulations provide a basis for many environmental improvements by industry, and compliance has become costly and increasingly complex. In 1996, the petroleum industry, including refining, spent as much on environmental protection as it spent searching for new domestic supplies: an estimated $8.2 billion (American Petroleum Institute, 2001). Jin and Grigalunas (1993) examine the impact of environmental regulation on firms in the oil and gas industry using optimal control theory assuming a constant technology. Their results indicate that rising environmental compliance costs lead to reductions in investment and production, implying that fewer resources will be developed over time, and the associated economic benefits will decline.
The command and control method of regulation is used in offshore oil and gas operations. There has been growing recognition for the need for more cost-effective approaches to environmental protection. For example, API recently called for "common sense" in regulations (API, 1996) , including a recommendation for more a flexible regulatory framework in determining how best to meet standards, potentially yielding the same environmental benefits at lower costs.
Data used in this analysis are obtained from the U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals
Management Service (MMS), Gulf of Mexico OCS Regional Office. Specifically, we develop our project database using five MMS data sets:
(1) Production data, including monthly oil, gas, and produced water outputs from every well in the Gulf of Mexico over the period from 1947 to 1998. The data include a total of 5,064,843 observations for 28,946 production wells. Because the early data did not include environmental reporting, we use the data for from above data set. Thus, the project database is comprised of well-level data for oil output, gas output, produced water output, and field-level data for the number of exploration wells drilled, total drilling distance of exploration wells, total vertical distance of exploration wells, number of development wells drilled, total drilling distance of development wells, total vertical distance of development wells, number of platforms, total number of slots, total number of slots drilled, water depth, oil reserves, gas reserves, original proved oil and gas combined reserves in BOE, discovery year, and porosity.
Although we have well-level production data, the well level is not a good unit for measuring technological efficiency due to spillover effects across wells within a given field.
Rather, the field level is a more appropriate unit for measuring technological efficiency. For this reason the relevant variables were extracted from these MMS data files and merged by year and field, so that the final data set was comprised of annual data at the field level over a 28-year time horizon. On average there are 406 fields operating in any particular year, and a total of 10,964 observations.
Our environmental output data set is composed of 33 different types of water pollutants in the four EPA categories, and oil spill volume from Coast Guard. The four categories are conventional pollutants, non-conventional organic pollutants, non-conventional metal pollutants and radionuclides. Conventional pollutants include oil, grease and total suspended solids (TSS).
Non-conventional organic pollutants include benzene, benzo(a)pyrene, chlorobenzene, di-nbutylphthalate, ethylbenzene, n-alkanes, naphthalene, P-chloro-M-cresol, phenol, steranes, toluene, triterpanes, total xylenes, 2-butanone and 2,4-dimethylphenol. Non-conventional metal pollutants include alminum, arsenic, barium, boron, cadmium, copper, iron, lead, manganese, mercury, nickel, silver, titanium and zinc. Radionuclides include radium 226 and radium 228.
To measure a tendency towards stringent environmental regulation, we use the environmental compliance cost for preventing water pollution and oil spills. Our environmental compliance cost is based on ex-ante estimates since we do not have the ex post cost studies 10 . We compiled a data file for water pollution and oil spill prevention costs from Federal Register and EPA documents which contains the ex-ante capital cost and operation and maintenance cost estimates by EPA for each set of regulations. These environmental regulations require phased implementation over a period of years and regulations are occasionally revised, which implies a variation in stringency over time.
Output variables in our model are oil production, gas production, the vector of 33 water pollution parameters described above and oil spills. Our input variables include number of platforms, platform size, number of development wells, number of exploration wells, average distance drilled for exploratory wells, average distance drilled for development wells, untreated produced water and environmental compliance cost. Field attributes are water depth, initial oil reserves, initial gas reserves, field porosity, and an aggregate measure of resource depletion, based on total extraction of oil and gas reserves in the Gulf of Mexico to date for each time period. Further description of the data is provided in Appendix. 10 Harrington, Morgenstern and Nelson (2000) looked at ex ante cost estimates of environmental regulations to the ex post cost estimates and compared the accuracy of estimates of the direct costs of more than two dozen regulations. They conclude, at least for EPA and OSHA rules, unit pollution reduction costs estimates are often accurate.
One goal of the study is to measure productivity effects and decompose the effects into those associated with specifically identifiable new technologies versus less structural effects, such as learning-by-doing. First, we adapt Moss' (1993) methodology to focus on technological innovation, rather than diffusion, and we extend the index for our full study period, from 1968 to 1998. We modify the Moss index to reflect innovation by counting only the first time a particular technology is reported, so our index measures technological innovation rather than diffusion 11 .
We further refined the Moss innovation count to consider the relative importance of particular innovations using a study by the National Petroleum Council (NPC). The NPC carried
out an industry survey to analyze the technological needs of the industry and to identify the expected impact of specific technological innovations, both in the short term and the long term (National Petroleum Council, 1995 In addition to this weighted innovation index, one important innovation of the recent decades is the extent of horizontal and directional drilling. Horizontal drilling refers to the ability to guide a drillstring to deviate at all angles from vertical, which allows the wellbore to intersect the reservoir from the side rather from above. This allows a much more efficient extraction of 11 Moss (1993) constructs a technology diffusion index that counts technology diffusion as it is reported in resources from thin or partly depleted formations. Horizontal drilling is also advantagous for formations with certain types of natural fractures, low permiability, a gap cap, bottom water, and for some layered formations. A measure of horizontal & directional drilling 13 and our weighted innovation variable are used in the DEA framework to partition impacts of technological change into components associated with specific technological innovations and more routine learning by doing in the following.
IV. Empirical Results
Data Envelopment Analysis
The DEA framework was used to measure productivity change and to carry out the various decompositions described above, thereby contributing to a better understanding of nature of technological change for our application. increases by about 34%, or a rate of about 3.2% per year. This is consistent with the increasing rate of technological progress that has been observed in the industry (e.g., Bohi, 1997).
The results of TC for total, oil & gas, and environmental sector are presented in Figure 2 .
Total, oil & gas production, environmental TC increase by about 48%, 35% and 10% from 1968 through 1995, respectively. Over the 28 year study period, TC change can be partitioned into 81.5 % due to oil and gas production sector, and 18.5% due to environmental sector. Thus, while there has been significant improvement environmental technology over the study period, it has industry trade journals.
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See Managi, Opaluch, Jin and Grigalunas (2001) Figure 4 shows the trends for innovation, learning by doing and diffusion for environmental technologies over period from 1968 through 1995. As discussed above, we find a much more modest increase in TFP for the environmental sector, as compared to the market sector (see Figure 3) . Innovation, LBD and diffusion increase by about 3%, 7% and 10% for the study period, respectively. Diffusion plays an important role in environmental TFP over the whole study period. Ignoring the rapid increase in LBD during the last 3 periods' rapid, cumulative diffusion effect is about 4.7 and 2.9 times as large as the affect associated with LBD and innovations on 1993, respectively.
The trend in LBD suggests that despite the fact that environmental regulations are of the command-and-control variety, to some extent industry is able to moderate the unit costs of compliance over time. Policy makers can not estimate this LBD compliance cost reduction effects ex ante, when regulations are being developed, since this LBD effect comes from the engineer's and manager's experience after regulations are implemented. This tends to lead to ex ante estimates that overestimate ex post pollution control costs. Note that our LBD effects are small compared to diffusion effects, and are much smaller than estimated LBD effects for market outputs (Manage, Opaluch, Jin and Grigalunas, 2001) , suggesting that technology-based regulations allow relatively little flexibility for cost saving, and ex ante unit cost estimates are relatively accurate. This is consistent with the results in Harrington, Morgenstern and Nelson (2000) , who conclude that unit pollution reduction costs estimates are often accurate for EPA 13 Appendix A describes the method used for calculating the measure of horizontal and directional drilling.
regulations. The technology-based methods used for offshore operations, limit innovative approaches to pollution abatement. For example, BAT may lead to the adoption of new technologies in the short-run, but as Jaffe et al. (2002) point out the long-term effect may be to discourage innovation simply because emission standards could be tightened each time the firm identifies a lower cost approach. These findings of modest levels of productivity increases in the environmental sector are consistent with the conceptual literature, which demonstrates that incentive-based environmental policies have far greater potential to encourage innovation than command and control-based policies.
Overall effects on joint production of oil & gas and environmental outputs are presented in Figure 5 . Innovation, LBD and diffusion lead to TFP increases of about 20%, 25% and 30%, respectively, over the study period. Note that diffusion plays the most important role until the end of the time horizon, when there is a clear trend towards LBD and innovation. LBD and innovation increase by about 2.2% and 1.4% per year, respectively. Increase in innovation mainly comes from oil & gas production sector, rather than the environmental sector. The increase productivity due to LBD came from both of oil & gas production and the environmental sector.
Additional insights into the nature of technological change can be obtained by identifying the extent to which it conforms to Hicks neutrality. Hicks neutrality of technological change for joint production implies parallel shifts in isoquants on the input side and parallel shifts in the production possibility frontiers on the output side. In contrast, biases in technological change imply relative changes in productivity across inputs and/or outputs, which imply non-parallel shifts of isoquants and/or production frontiers.
DEA decomposes productivity change into output biased technological change (OBTC), input biased technological change (IBTC) and magnitude change (MC). However, DEA only provides overall, absolute measures of input and output biases (Färe and Grosskopf, 1996) , in contrast to the parametric measurements of bias (e.g., Antle and Capalbo, 1988) , which provide relative measures, such as input using or saving for each factor. The DEA measure of OBTC identifies the extent to which technological change increases productivity of each output relative to all other outputs. Similarly, IBTC identifies whether technological change increases productivity of each input relative to all other inputs. When the DEA measures of OBTC and IBTC simultaneously equal 1, productivity change is Hicks neutral, and productivity change equals the magnitude change component of the DEA decomposition.
With Model 2 we find an IBTC measure of 1. 81 and OBTC measure of 1. 29. Therefore, the overall technological change bias index, which is the product of IBTC and OBTC, is 2.32.
Unfortunately, DEA is not a statistical technique, and therefore does not allow one to test for statistical significance. However, the overall bias index is sufficiently far from one to suggest that Hicks neutral technological change probably does not hold in Model 2, which includes market outputs only. In comparison, we find larger biases on both the input and output sides (IBTC=1.96 OBTC=1.60) for the joint production model, which includes market and environmental outputs. These higher biases in technological change are consistent with observation that technological change with respect to market goods is much larger than technological change with respect to environmental goods, suggesting a bias in technological change towards market outputs relative to environmental outputs.
Testing the Porter Hypothesis
As discussed above, the Porter hypothesis is based on the notion that well defined environmental regulations spur technological change, which could lead to increased productivity and, ultimately, increased profits for the regulated industry. Below we provide two tests of the Porter hypothesis. First, we use Almon Distributed lag models to test whether increases in the stringency of environmental regulations affect various measures of productivity for production of market goods and for joint production of market and environmental goods.
Next we use Granger causality tests to explore causal directions between changes in productivity and environmental stringency. To do so, we use technological change (TC) and total factor productivity (TFP) as dependent variables, and we use lags on environmental stringency as explanatory variables. When TC is the dependent variable, the model provides a test of changes in the efficiency frontier, and when TFP is the dependent variable, the model provides a test for overall changes in productivity, including efficiency change (EF) or "catching up" by inefficient production units. We also test causality in the other direction, where we test The standard Porter hypothesis states that productivity of market outputs, hence profitability, may increase with the stringency of environmental regulations. However, we are also interested in testing our re-cast version Porter hypothesis, where efficiency is measured with respect to the joint production of market and environmental outputs. Thus, we carry out these tests using productivity measures for market outputs (oil and gas production) only and for joint production of market and environmental outputs.
The results for the Almon lag model are reported in Table 2 However, the examining lags on market outputs only indicate that changes in environmental stringency has no significant effect of productivity of market goods in the short term or in the long term. The individual lags and the sum of all lags are not statistically significant at standard levels. Hence, our results do not support the standard version of the Porter hypothesis, which states that increases in the stringency of environmental regulations spur innovation that leads to increases in productivity of market outputs, thereby leading to increased profits in the long term.
Next, we apply Granger causality tests to further explore the causal relationships between the stringency of environmental regulations and various productivity measures. The Granger causality test is a more rigorous test than that based on the Almon lag model, discussed above, in two ways. First, the Granger test identifies whether the lags on the independent variable (stringency of environmental regulations) adds explanatory power, relative to the model based on lagged dependent variable (productivity change). Secondly, the Granger test examines causality in both directions, so that it can potentially distinguish between models where causality goes in either or both directions.
The first set of hypotheses for the Granger tests relate to the Porter hypothesis. Thus, the Porter hypothesis is consistent with positive and statistically significant coefficients on lags of environmental regulations in the regression equation for productivity. The second set of hypotheses in the Granger tests relate to whether productivity is a determining factor in determining the stringency of future environmental regulations.
Both sets of null hypotheses are based on non-causality, and are tested using Wald statistics. So that the Granger causality test is that 'X does not Granger cause Y', and rejecting a null hypothesis is consistent with a finding of causality. The optimal number of lags is also a critical issue in Granger causality test. We use a group of information criteria: AIC, Schwarz
Bayesian criteria (SC), and Akaike final prediction error criterion (FPE) 15 , and we find identical results for the appropriate lags for each of the three criteria.
As indicated in Table 3 , we find that environmental stringency causes TC in the joint production model, which is consistent with the re-stated version of the Porter hypothesis. In contrast, we find no significant causality between stringency of environmental regulations and productivity of market goods, thus rejecting the standard form for Porter hypothesis. Of course, it should be emphasized that this result is for our application only, and that special circumstances
14
Second degree polynomial with end point restrictions is used.
15
See Giles and Mirza (1999) Finally, we test whether higher productivity leads to more stringent environmental regulations. We also find a causal link from technological change of market outputs to environmental stringency, but not for joint production. This finding is more consistent with the environmental Kuznets curve than with technology-based standards.
V. Discussion and Conclusion
Technological progress plays an important role in addressing environmental problems, while simultaneously maintaining standards of living. Over the past 50 years our profession has greatly improved our understanding the process of technological innovation. We have progressed from "confessions of ignorance", where time is the only "explanatory" variable in technological progress, towards an understanding of the mechanisms that drive productivity change and measurement of various components of productivity change.
This paper contributes to the literature on productivity change in several ways. First, we apply Data Envelopment Analysis to a unique field-level data set to measure various components of total factor productivity within a joint production model, which considers both market and environmental outputs. This contributes to our understanding of the impact environment controls have had on various components of total factor productivity in this industry, and thereby the potential for technological change to maintain productivity in the face of increasingly stringent environmental regulations.
The results show an upward trend in productivity in the Gulf of Mexico offshore oil and gas industry, despite depletion and increasingly stringent environmental regulations. Our findings indicate improved productivity of environmental technologies, but environmental productivity change has lagged behind that for market outputs. Over the 28 year study period, TFP change can be partitioned into nearly 80% due to oil and gas production sector, and about 20% due to environmental sector. This may be due in part to the command-and-control nature of most environmental regulations, which allow much less flexibility for innovative solutions, as compared to that for market outputs.
We also analyzed the contribution of technological change and efficiency change in TFP both for oil & gas production and for environmental technologies. Next we apply two models to understand the dynamic relationship between the stringency of environmental regulations and productivity, and thereby test the Porter hypothesis. The
Porter hypothesis states that well designed environmental regulations could spur innovation, leading to long run increases in productivity and hence increased profits for the regulated industry. We recast the Porter hypothesis to explore the relationship between environmental regulations and productivity more fully. Specifically, we test whether environmental regulations enhance joint productivity of environmental and market outputs, in addition to the standard Porter hypothesis which applies to productivity of market outputs only.
Our results support the recast version of Porter hypothesis, which examines productivity of joint production of market and environmental outputs. But we find no evidence for the standard formulation of the Porter hypothesis, which states that increased stringency of environmental regulation leads to increased productivity of market outputs. This finding could be due in part to the command-and-control design of environmental regulations in offshore oil and gas, which historically has not provided much latitude for innovation in achieving environmental goals. Flexible environmental regulations are required to provide incentives for innovation, which could result in a net positive effect on productivity. In contrast, inflexible technology-based environmental regulations are less likely to contribute to innovation.
This suggests that we must be careful to maintain a realistic view of the potential for environmental regulations. An overly naïve conviction that there exists a near universal potential for win-win solutions in environmental problems could be used to justify poorly conceived environmental policies. Drilling is assumed to affect output starting the following year, since current drilling does not affect current production. So well inputs in period t is determined by cumulative drilling through period t-1. At any point in time ultimately recoverable resources are not known. Rather, the remaining resource is estimated using current economically (not physically) known reserve stock minus resources produced to date. We also take cumulative value for output variables including oil, gas production to take account of the technological characteristics. We measured depletion effect on the remaining stocks of oil and gas in the Gulf of Mexico at period t-1 by expressing it as a ratio of terminal production. This captures the effects how difficult the new discovery is in the Gulf of Mexico.
Appendix. Data Construction
DEA requires the data on input usage and on characteristics that determine output.
Therefore, we created the water depth input as maximum water depth in the Gulf of Mexico minus water depth in each field since production is more difficult in deeper water depth in given technology. Units of oil and gas production are barrel and thousand cubic feet, respectively.
Platform size is defined as average number of slots per platform for the field. Units of oil and gas reserves are million barrel and billion cubic feet, respectively. Units of remaining oil and gas reserves in the Gulf of Mexico, and porosity are measured in percent terms. Missing porosity is estimated using two-step estimation procedure to correct for this omitted variable problem (Heckman 1979; Greene 1981 ) (see precise statistics in Managi, Opaluch, Jin and Grigalunas, 2001 ). The data source of water pollution includes EPA regulations. All of water pollution data are concentration units and are multiplied to untreated produced water, where MMS is the data source, in field level as a pollution output, assuming pollution concentration is constant over fields each year since we do not have field base pollution concentration data. More precise description of data is in Managi (2002) . 
